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NOTES AND COMMEI:NTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RECENT DECISIONS ON THE EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE ASPECTS
OF THE GUARANTY OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS
Three recent decisions,' ranging from a ruling of an inferior court
of Ohio to a judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, once
again present the question of the scope of the free speech and the free
press guaranty in both its extensive and its intensive aspects. In one of
these Cases acting under the authority of an ordinance which expressly
conditioned licenses to motion picture exhibitors on a power of revocation
if the exhibition was found to be immoral, indecent, or injurious to the
public welfare, Cincinnati officials demanded a deletion of a portion of
the motion picture "The Birth of a Baby" or discontinuance of its
public exhibition. Thereupon, the American committee on Maternal
Welfare, Inc., sponsors of the picture, and Special Pictures Corp., to
which ownership of the picture had been transferred on its completion,
filed a bill for an injunction based on the contentions (i) that the city's
action constituted a violation of the right of freedom of speech and press,
and (2) that the ordinance conflicted with state laws governing censor-
ship of motion pictures, under which this picture had been approved.
Though the plaintiffs had their remedy on the second ground, the first
was refused.2
For this refusal, the Ohio common pleas court relied almost com-
pletely on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States inlutual Film Co. v. Ohio Industral Com.,3 involving the power of a
state to establish a system of censorship for motion pictures. Though a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment was there alleged in the suit
filed in the federal district court, the case was disposed of by the Supreme
Court on an interpretation of the Ohio Constitution. The kernel of
the court's reasoning, accepted with finality in the instant Ohio court,
appears in the observation that: "It cannot be put out of view that the
1 American Committee v. Cincinnati, z6 Ohio L. Abs. 533 (938); Commonwealth v.
Kimball, 13 N.E. (2d) rS (Mass. 1938)5 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58
S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 66o (1938).
2 American Committee v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 533 (1938).
'236 U.S. 230, 35 S. Ct. 387, £9 L. Ed. 55z (1915).
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exhibition of motion pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor
intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of
the press of the country or as organs of public opinion." It is not easy
to square such reasoning with the unquestioned immunity of the modern
newspaper, but recently reaffirmed in Grosjean v. American Press Co.4
It requires no citation of data to sustain the assertion that the publication
of newspapers is just as much a "business pure and simple," the major
purposes of news collection and dissemination being to build a circulation
that will be attractive to advertisers. Judging from the language of the
Mutual Film opinion, the differentiation that the Court was attempting
to draw was more accurately one of the divergent extent to which
films and newspapers operate as mediums of thought and organs of
public opinion. This differentiation is reflected, not only in the opinion
in the principal case, but also in that of Pathi News v. Cobb,5 the only
other decision which has been found that considers in its extensive aspect
the scope of the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press.
In all three of the cases cited the motion picture business is grouped with
the theatre, the circus, and other types of spectacles, and its quality as a
medium of thought viewed as but incidental to its quality as a mode of
entertainment. On the other hand, the newspaper traditionally has been
regarded by the courts as an institution in which the expression of
thought and opinion is the prime rather than the incidental function.
At the time the Supreme Court dealt with the issue, and as late as
1922, considerable basis existed for such a distinction; but that a court
can stand on the same basis today, as the Ohio court has now attempted
to do, is questionable. For, in the past fifteen or twenty years, the
motion picture has graduated from the era of slapstick comedy and gushy
romanticism to a period of wide use of the movie medium for instruction,
expression of opinion, and propagandism. There is no dearth of factual
evidence to the effect that today, far more than in 1915 or 1922, motion
pictures constitute an organ for the expression of public opinion,6 and
297 U.S. 233, S6 S. Ct. 444, 8o L. Ed. 66o (1936).
5
zoz App. Div. 450, 195 N.Y. Supp. 661 (gzz).
'The American Committee on Maternal Welfare, Incorporated, was organized by
some of the nation's leading gynecologists and obstetricians in 1919, for the purpose of
promoting maternal and child welfare. It is composed of representatives of sixteen medical
and welfare bodies including the American College of Surgeons, United States Public
Health Service, American Medical Association, and Children's Bureau of the United States
Department of Labor.
In June, 1936, a committee of five doctors was appointed by the American Committee
of Maternal Welfare, Incorporated, to carry out the project of producing a picture based
on the story of a young mother during the period of pregnancy and birth. That committee
was composed of Doctor Fred L. Adair, of the University of Chicago; Doctor James R.
McCord, of Emory University; Doctor Everett D. Plass, of the University of Iowa;
Doctor Arthur L. Skell, of Cleveland, Ohio; Doctor Philip F. Williams, of the University
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play an influential part in setting the tone of community life.7 It is
significant that in the principal case the production and presentation of
the picture in issue was sponsored by a non-profit corporation formed
for the purpose of promoting maternal and child welfare. Undoubtedly
new impetus is by this presentation being given to the movement, already
begun, to use the screen as a medium of opinion formulation. There is
increasing moment today to the concession the Path6 News court felt
obliged to make in 1922, namely, that although the motion picture was
only incidentally a medium for thought propagation, it was, even so,
more influential than the printed page, especially with the young and
semi-literate.
A refinement of this distinction between the prime and incidental
nature of the expression of public opinion was superimposed by the courts
when the movie companies in Pathi News v. Cobb, ante, sought to
employ it advantageously by challenging the censorship of news-reels.
Unwilling to say that this form of motion picture presentation was essen-
tially entertainment, the court drew a distinction between modes of
expression, argumentative or conceptual in character and those that are
descriptive or concrete. The essential thing privileged by the Constitu-
tion, stated the court, is not the news feature, but the right to publish
of Pennsylvania. The scenario was made by Doctor Fred L. Adair and Doctor Warren
Cox, aided by Arthur Jarrett and Burke Symon, professional scenarists. The license
agreement under which it would be shown provided expressly against abuses in its exhibi-
tion (taken from the opinion of Judge Gunn in the case of Special Pictures Corporation v.
Division of Motion Picture Censors in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Va.,
September x9, 1938). This is not the sole example of such a procedure. At the instigation
of the Sentinels of America, the Amateur Fire Brigade was produced and shown free of
charge in 1936. The American Legion is now supporting a picture in Hollywood which
deals with Legion activities. Other examples exist. Even when organizations may not
enter the field of production, they frequently exert tremendous influence on production by
acting in various manners as pressure groups. In a publication of the Public Relations
Department of the Fox West Coast Agency Corporation, reports are made of the nature
nf the reviews given by a partial list of organizations, providing reviewing services:
Daughters of the American Revolution, The American Legion Auxiliary, California
Congress of Parents and Teachers, Council of Federated Church Women, California
Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, National Society of New Eng-
land Women, General Federation of Women's Clubs, National Board of Reviews,
National Council of je% ish Women, and Women's University Club.
In the Bulletins on Current Films issued by the National Council for Prevention
of War note the reference made in issue No. 59 of date Oct. 29, 1938 to a plan of
Paramount Pictures to produce a film, tentatively called "Invasion," the story prepared
by Captain Win. F. Cox of the Chemical Warfare Division of the U. S. Army, depicting
what happens when a peaceful country is made victim of a surprise attack; note the
interpretations the writer gives to the movies' activities of the last wari and note the
appeal he makes, too, for a pressure on the motion picture companies. See his classification
on a military motif of current pictures in issue No. 58 of date Oct. 14, 1938. See in
bulletins No. 55 and 56 of dates June 20, 1938 and July 7, 1938 the accounts of the
presure for and against the showing of "Blockade" and their effect on future plans for
production. For other reference to the boycott see contemporary issues of Life magazine.
In toto, the bulletins are indicative of pressures and counter pressures vieing for their
particular views to be given force in motion pictures. The recognition would seem to be
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one's sentiments, those decisions of the mind formed by deliberation,
reasoning, thought, opinion, notion or judgment. So, those things priv-
ileged had not only to be primarily organs of opinion, but also primarily
expressions of the opinion, as such. No sound basis for this distinction
appears.
Any justification of this distinction must be founded on the untenable
proposition that the Constitutional Fathers guaranteed the right of free
speech solely to provide satisfaction to the individual desiring to express
his opinion. Whereas, more frequently it is emphasized that they
intended this right to safeguard democracy by making freely available
to the people, on whom the government rests, divergent opinions, beliefs,
facts, and interpretations of facts. But even though this proposition were
tenable, the distinction is impossible in fact, because opinion is as force-
fully expressed through careful selection and organization of facts as
through argumentation. The ideology which a newspaper supports is
no more readily ascertainable from its editorial column than from the
facts given prominence in its news columns, and the subtle expression of
the latter may ultimately be of greater effect. The strict application of
this refinement to newspapers would clearly result in the censorship of
a great part of the materials relating to news reporting and news com-
mentation, now published unchallenged.
made by all groups that one ideology is to be represented in greater frequency than its
particular counter-ideology, and that this circumstance will have an important influence
on the one to be accepted. Further, to exclude all is impossible.
It is a well known fact that large numbers of pressure groups including the American
Legion, the American Civil Liberties Union, League for Peace and Democracy, the Catholic
Church, Friends of Spanish Democracy and the D.A.R. make direct appeals to and seek
to influence the decisions of the various censorship boards. To say that they are of no
effect would seem to be highly unrealistici to say of what effect would be speculative
and dependent on personal analysis.
For a commending account of the activities of the Catholic Church, influencing pro-
duction both directly and indirectly, see "Motion Picture Abuses," za Marquette L. Rev.
105, 113-117 (937)5 for a criticism of such activities see Catholic Movie Censorship,
The New Republic, vol. 96, page 233 (October S, 1938).
7 The Payne Fund Studies aimed at discovering the influence of motion pictures on
children and investigated by a group of psychologists, sociologists and educators. Member-
ship of the Committee on E'ducational Research of The Payne Fund was as follows:
H. H. Thurstone, Frank W. Freeman, R. E. Park, Herbert Blumer, Philip M. Houser of
the University of Chicago; George D. Stoddard, Christian A. Ruckmick, P. ,V. Holoday,
and Wendell Dysinger of the University of Iowa5 Mark A. Maynard and Frank K.
Shuttleworth of Yale University; Charles C. Peters of Pennsylvania State College; Ben D.
Wood of Columbia University; and Samuel Renshaw, Edgar Dale, and W. W. Charters
of Ohio State University. For a short summary of the findings see "Motion Pictures and
Youth": A summary by W. W. Charters, Director, Bureau of Educational Research, Ohio
State University, published for the first time in 1933. For greater detail see the individual
books separately published by the various members of the committee therein referred to
and cited.
An article in Harper's for January, February, and March, 1938, "Business Finds Its
Voice," by S. H. Walker and Paul Sklar indicates that business has given recognition to
the importance of this influence.
A book entitled "Our Movie Made Children" by Henry James Forman published by
the Macmillan Company 1933 has pointed popular attention to these facts.
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But whatever basis in law once existed for the Path6 News distinction
in 1922, today its validity is substantially impaired. Lovell v. City of
G riffin' most recent of the Supreme Court's enunciations on freedom
of speech and press, posed the question of the immunity of the modern
pamphleteers. The Court's answer was unequivocal: "The press in its
historic connotations comprehends every sort of publication which affords
a vehicle of information and opinion."'
In the absence of cogent reasons for separate classification, the refusal
to bring the motion picture within the purview of the free speech and
free press guaranty would seem to rest entirely on its non-existence at
the time the Constitution was formulated. It is on this important
question that this latest judicial expression of the Supreme Court is, also,
extremely significant. That policy of constitutional construction which
limits a prohibition or a delegation of power to the conscious thought of
its authors, though frequently professed,"0 has been also frequently criti-
cized in recent discussion and avowedly discarded." The method ignores
the acknowledged nature of constitutions and the difference between
active and latent intent.' 2 Objection to this restricted interpretation has
even greater persuasiveness when, as here, the courts are dealing not
with questions which the formulators only partially foresaw, but with
a question that they did not contemplate, even in a general way. Some
precedent in this very field for not following this rule of construction
already exists in those cases holding the censorship laws applicable to
sound films which were non-existent at the time of the enactment."
Since the opinion in the case serving as the basic authority for denying
immunity to motion pictures was written by Mr. Justice McKenna,
who was himself among the most eloquent in criticising the older policy
303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 8z L. Ed. 66o (1938).
Italics are the writer's.
',, Dissent of Chief Justice White in Weems V. U. S., 217 U.S. 349, 54 L. Ed. 793,
30 S.C. 544 (1910); Mr. Justice Strong's opinion in 79 U.S. (r2 Wall.) 457, 20 L. Ed.
287 (1870); Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v.
Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 58 S. Ct. 436, 82 L. Ed. 457 (1938) (in which he contends that
the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to include corpora-
tions); Mattox v. U. S., xS6 U.S. 237, 15 S. Ct. 337, 39 L. Ed. 409 (1895).
'1 Dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.5. 438, 48 S. Ct.
564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928), in part stating . . . "this court has repeatedly sustained the
e.ercise of power by Congress, under various clauses of that instrument, over objects of
which the Fathers could not have dreamed." Therein cited in substantiation were: Pensa-
cola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. I, 24 L. Ed. 708 (877);
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 25o U.S. 135, 39 S. Ct. 5o2, 63 L. Ed. 897
(g99). And see Brooks v. U. S., 267 U.S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699 (1925).
-, "Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Con-
struction" by Jacobus ten Brock in 26 Calif. L. Rev. 664 (1938).
"'In re Fox Film Corp., z95 Pa. 461, x45 Atl. 514 (1929); In re Vitagraph Inc.,
295 Pa. 471, 145 At. 5xS (1929) (Suppression of free speech was not there argued).
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of judicial construction,14 it seems altogether reasonable to assume the
decision was not founded upon it. And, the language of the court in the
Lovell case, in an opinion by the present Chief Justice, dearly implies a
functional approach in terms of the basic purpose underlying the inclusion
of this guaranty in the fundamental law. Difficulty on this score ought
not, then, to exist, especially now that the talking picture technique aids
in minimizing the physical dissimilarity between the motion picture
medium and the older accepted media of expression. If this be so, and
the earlier appraisal of this medium be no longer supportable in fact, the
comprehension of the motion picture within the extensive scope of the
guaranty would seem necessarily to follow.
The association in the legal mind of the motion picture with the
theatre, the circus, and other spectacles, causing the former to share the
latter's unfavorable moral connotation, tends to explain the ease with
which judges paralleled the complete regulation of the theatre and the
hesitancy which they showed toward making the extension urged upon
them. The opinions, replete with references to evil charm and beguiling
fascination, elaborate their potentialities for harmful influence. The
standards of the followers of the "show business" are compared unfavor-
ably with those of the newspaper personnel, in lack of discretion and
restraint and in "appreciation of the business advantage of depicting the
evil and voluptuous thing with the poisonous charm;" but valid or not,
these considerations have no pertinency to the scope of the free speech
and press guaranty in its extensive aspect.
For if only innocuous forms of expression are within it, the guaranty
is a myth. Such considerations do have meaning, on the other hand,
relative to the question of the intensive scope of the guaranty, for the
determination of the pervasiveness of the protection accorded the media
which fall within the guaranty involves a balancing of values: on the
one hand, the political values inherent in unstifled expression; on the
other, perhaps, the safeguard against disorder, obscenity or revolution.
An analysis of the cases above discussed conveys the distinct impression
that the courts have felt themselves faced with the alternative of bringing
the motion picture within the orbit of the guaranty, and so endangering
the constitutionality of existing censorship laws, or of leaving this medium
of expression outside the range of protection and thus avoiding this
danger; and that mindful of the factors above outlined, they have chosen
14 "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined
to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief, which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constructions.
I I I " Weems v, U. S., 217 U.S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54. L. Ed. 793 (91o).
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the latter courses as embodying the lesser of two evils. 5 For the guaranty
of free speech and free press has been increasingly emphasized as one of
protection against previous restraint of the type involved in motion picture
censorship by governmental boards. The implicit assumption that some
form of censorship is necessary in the motion picture field in order to
protect against morally undesirable pictures may well be challenged.
The ever existing danger that censorship for moral purposes will serve
as a cloak for censorship of political, economic, and social views,18
together with the fact that recent years have demonstrated the power
of organized public opinion to control the morals problem'7 constitutes
a strong argument that with motion pictures as with other media, prior
restraint of any type is inconsistent with a vitalized meaning of freedom
of speech and press. Yet a contrary view is not devoid of reasonable
basis. Though the action for liberal and the relative opportunity for
open refutation render amenable to control the chief abuses of the news-
paper and pamphlet, neither of these could provide a safeguard against
immoral influences, once they were exerted. There would be no weapon
open to those aggrieved except the one of organized drives for cleaner
pictures.
That the Supreme Court is sensitive to the specific problem raised by
consideration as to public morals is attested by its language in Near v.
Alinnesota,'5 where one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule
against previous restraint, which is there enforced, is declared to be that
of the enforcement of "the primary requirements of decency against
obscene publications." Since the court was here probably thinking of the
ruling in Ex larte Jackson, dealing with governmental power over the
mails, it is necessarily a matter of conjecture whether, were the motion
pictures brought within the orbit of the guaranty, its peculiar problems
would be deemed to justify a carefully delineated form of previous
restraint. Nevertheless, two recent decisions, Lovell v. City of Griffin0
and Commonwealth v. Kimball," recently decided by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, do cast considerable light upon the
judicial problem of balancing the guaranty of freedom of expression
' Criticism, almost contemporary with the early decision, as to the choice of lesser
evil may be found in a lecture on "Law of the Motion Picture Industry" delivered by
Gustavus A. Rogers, LL.B., of the New York Bar in 1916.
"6 That such a change is a present fact may be the reader's inference from the facts
suggested in paragraph two of footnote one.
" The extent of this effectiveness is suggested by a reading of the material cited in
paragraph five of footnote one.
18 283 U.S. 697, 7x6, gi S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 ('93').
29 96 U.S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877 (1877).
303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 66o (1938).
13 N.E. (2d) IS (Mass. 1938).
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against public interests of the general type involved in the motion picture
situation.
In the Kimball litigation, a garment worker engaged in distributing
announcements of the presentation of a labor play was arrested and
prosecuted under a municipal ordinance containing broad prohibitions
against the dissemination in public places of posters, bills, or sheets of
paper of any description containing advertising of any kind.22 On appeal
Massachusetts' high court construed the word "advertising" as not
limited to commercial matter, found the case not within the exception
provided for in the ordinance, and sustained the municipal legislation as
a valid exercise of the police power. Following close on this decision,
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Lovell case, declared
unconstitutional as a violation of the guaranty of free speech and
free press an ordinance requiring the licensing of all distribution of cir-
culars, handbills, advertising, or literature of any kind.23 The existence
of the licensing provision in addition to the broad, undifferentiated sweep
of the ordinance's prohibitions tends to obscure the point on which the
Court's decision may accurately be said to turn. The Court lays consid-
erable stress upon the censorship factor, declaring that "whatever the
motive" of this ordinance, "it strikes at the very foundation of the free-
dom of the press." If this factor was of itself decisive of the issue, the
Lovell decision would indicate not only that the licensing device is no
longer available to municipalities in the regulation of the distribution of
literature, but, as well, that the Court might not tolerate the existence
of any form of censorship in connection with the motion picture medium
as a form of expression within the protection of the Constitutional
guaranty.
On the other hand, such an interpretation of the Supreme Court's
decision gives no effect to other paragraphs of the opinion, in which the
Court emphasizes the complete absence in the ordinance of any limita-
tions either on the kind of literature circulated or on the mode of distri-
bution. "The ordinance is not limited to literature that is obscene or
12 The terms of the ordinance were as follows: "No person shall distribute posters,
bills nor sheets of paper of any description, containing advertising matter of any kind,
whether printed or written, in any public street, highway, or public placei nor shall cause
the same to be done by another."
2' The terms of the ordinance were: "Section s. That the practice of distributing,
either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind,
whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold, within the
limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City
Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed an offense against the City
of Griffin.
"Section 2. The Chief of Police of the City of Griffin and the police force of the
City of Griffin are hereby required and directed to suppress the same and to abate any
nuisance as is described in the first section of this ordinance."
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offensive to public morals or that advocates unlawful conduct. . . . It
is not limited to ways which might be regarded as inconsistent with the
maintenance of public order, or as involving the molestations of the
inhabitants, or the misuse or littering of the streets." If the undifferen-
tiated character of the ordinance in these tvo respects was itself sufficient
to make for invalidity, without the addition of the censorship feature, then
the Lovell decision directly contradicts the judgment of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts; the fact that the Kimball ordinance
was limited to distribution in public places, whereas the Lovell ordinance
applied to any place whatsoever, would not seem a sufficient delimitation
as to mode of distribution to satisfy the test indicated by the Supreme
Court.
Except for a passing reference in one decision, the other state courts
which have been faced with this question have been concerned, in their
resolution of the validity of the ordinances before them, solely with the
types of literature subjected to control. Newspapers, it may be contended
with force, are in large measure advertising; clearly they, in terms of
the Massachusetts ordinance, "contain advertising matter." However,
no examples of an attempt to extend such ordinances to newspapers have
been found and a number of cases seem either to have assumed 4 or to
have directly held2" that, if construed in such a way as to be applicable
to newspapers, the enactments would be unsustainable. This view
accords with the Lovell case, which by its specific allusion to that range
of application has with finality ruled against its justification. On the
other hand, though a type not specifically but only inferentially referred
to by the Supreme Court as subject to municipal control, it would seem
certain that commercial advertising is a thing the distribution of which
cities could restrain. One state court has sustained an ordinance by
delimiting its scope to this type of literature,26 as the Massachusetts court
refused to do.
In the Kimball case the court suggested the absence of any public
habit of dropping in the street a particular class of material as a rational
ground for excepting that class from the terms of the prohibition. This
suggested distinction had, in its application to newspapers, been earlier
used by the Wisconsin court to refute counsel's contention that the ordi-
nance before the court was either intended to apply only to commercial
advertising, in which case it was conceded to be constitutional, or
extended to other literature including newspapers, and was thus invalid;
M Ailwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 234 N.W. 35z (1930)
-Pcople v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. ZSS, 41 N.,. 275 (1899); City of Chicago v.
Schultz, 3+1 IIL 2o8, 173 N.E. Z76 (1930)3
"'People v. Johnson, 191 N. Y. Supp. 7501 117 Misc. 133 (x92).
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newspapers were distinguished as not a source of litter and the ordinance
sustained in its applicability to other types of distributable material irre-
spective of content. Municipal power to prohibit distribution of other
types, including the smaller-sized pamphlet, solely on the basis of their
tendency to become a source of litter, is doubtful, however, in the light
of the Supreme Court's great emphasis upon the vital necessity of pro-
tecting every sort of publication which affords a vehicle for expression.
If the exercise of municipal power is to be constitutionally successful, it
must at the least be directed to patently undesirable modes of distribution,
to pamphlets or other material of obscene, offensive or dangerous char-
acter, or possibly to both. But the litigation which has so far developed
on this matter of municipal control of distribution does not conclusively
how that a city or state is powerless to subject the distribution of litera-
ture or the exhibition of motion pictures to a control reasonably related
to the promotion of cleanliness in its physical or moral connotations.
ANNA FAYE BLACKBURN
CORPORATIONS
LEGAL ASPECTS OF CO-OPERATIVE MEDICINE
In recent years there has been much interest in co-operative medical
societies. Co-operative medicine is distinguishable from socialized medi-
cine in that it is devoid of any financial aid from the government. It
has been held legal for a nonprofit corporation to furnish members with
medical services rendered by physicians under contracts with the cor-
poration. Group Health Association v. Moor et al., 24 F. Supp. 445
(July 27, 1938) noted, 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 120 (1938). This case
has been publicized as involving a question which has never before been
decided by a court. The formation of such a society in Ohio raises legal
difficulties. Several physicians may organize a partnership through which
they offer their services to the members of a co-operative society. This
would make possible the furnishing of specialized services. However,
under such an organization there is liability on the individual physician
for all acts done by a co-partner which are within the scope of the part-
nership contract. This may serve as a deterrent.
For the co-operative organization to incorporate would facilitate the
administration of such a scheme. However, there are legal obstacles to
such an organization. It is possible that the courts would hold that the
corporation was engaging in the practice of medicine. Ohio G.C.
8623-3, which provides that a corporation for profit may not be organ-
